GitHub 是不是挂了？

We suspected that CCA Automations were experiencing delays when users start an Automation, but further investigation found that there was no delay or impact to CCA Automations.

On October 13, around 20:42 UTC, an infrastructure failure caused GitHub Actions to have delays showing logs for workflow runs. No logs were lost and the issue has now been resolved and log processing has caught up. The actual workflows producing the logs were not impacted and ran normally and no run delays or check delays occurred.

On October 12th 2026 11:51 UTC GitHub experienced elevated 500 responses across several application pages. This caused failures on Issues and Pull Requests as well as Projects and Actions. Customers also experienced delayed notifications in their web inbox and via email. The immediate impact to Issues, Pull Requests, Projects, and Actions was mitigated by 12:41 UTC on October 12th. Notifications deliveries to the web inbox and via email were recovering at 15:27 UTC and fully mitigated by 20:16 UTC. The incident was triggered through a latent condition in our notifications delivery pipeline that put a high volume of an expensive query on our sharded database replicas. This reduced available database capacity to serve requests for Issues, Pull Requests, Projects, and Actions. We have fixed the notifications pipeline’s code path that issued the expensive query. We are also improving resilience of the database layer to reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents.

On October 7, 2026, from 16:52 to 17:01 UTC, GitHub experienced a recurrence of the write-operation outage from earlier that day. Both outages shared the same root cause. Please refer to the combined summary covering both incidents, their impact, and our prevention measures: https://www.githubstatus.com/incidents/djlmxz2zd0j7

On October 7, 2026, GitHub had two outages of write operations with the same cause, totaling about 19 minutes. The first ran from 15:06 to 15:16 UTC (about 10 minutes) and the second from 16:52 to 17:01 UTC (about 9 minutes). In both windows, actions that save or change data failed across Git operations, pull requests, issues, GitHub Actions, the API, webhooks, sign-in and authentication, GitHub Apps and OAuth, code scanning, Codespaces, and Copilot. Reading data was largely unaffected. In the first outage, 5.6% of all web and API requests failed, peaking at 8.9%, and more than 12,000 organizations saw failed requests. Up to 26% of Git authentication requests failed, and 17% of Actions workflow runs failed with infrastructure errors. In the second outage, 6.2% of web and API requests failed, peaking at 9.3%, and more than 11,000 organizations were affected. Up to 25% of Git authentication requests failed, and 19% of Actions workflow runs failed. No databases experienced data loss, and operations retried after recovery succeeded. GitHub relies on an internal service that keeps track of which database servers should receive new and updated data. While replacing machines that run this service as part of regular maintenance, one of the new machines started with an outdated copy of its records, which still listed database servers we had already retired. When this node came online, it incorrectly modified routing configuration with the outdated records, routing write requests to non-existent database servers. Each outage ended when one of our established machines with correct configuration became the leader of the quorum and sent the correct configuration. After the first outage, we identified the new machine as the source and paused automated maintenance to stop it from being leader again. At 16:52 UTC, an automated maintenance task that did not honor the pause put it back in charge, and the outage happened again. We shut that machine down at 17:02 UTC and have since removed it, and the automation now honors the pause, which was a new regression due to an update of our puppet infrastructure. To prevent recurrence, we are clearing retired database servers from the service's records before any new machine is added, and we are keeping new machines from being elected leader until their records have been checked. We are also changing our systems to reject configuration that point to servers that don't exist and to keep using the last known-good settings instead. Finally, we are giving responders a faster way to take a misbehaving machine out of service, and adding alerts so changes like this are spotted within seconds. We will share a more detailed write-up of these incidents in our monthly availability report, along with the status of the repairs we are making to prevent issues like these in the future.